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The U.S. grapefruit industry is dependent on  This  article  is  intended  to  measure  the
continual growth in fresh sales in both domes-  growth in the export markets for fresh grape-
tic and  foreign  markets.  From  1969  to  1975  fruit and to show specifically  the potential eco-
slightly more than 40 percent  of each season's  nomic impact of Japanese trade restrictions.  A
output  went  to fresh use.  Much  of the  future  seemingly  unrelated  regression  model  is used
growth  in fresh use  is  expected  to come from  to estimate the FOB derived demands for fresh
new and larger export markets. Both political  grapefruit and the economic impact from trade
and economic trade problems continue to occur  restrictions is analyzed.
as  greater  emphasis  is  placed  on  the  export
markets for fresh grapefruit.  Threats of Jap-  HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS
anese  embargoes  and restrictions  on contain-
ers and fumigants present continual  problems  The  domestic  market has  been  a  dominant
with the development  of the Japanese  export  outlet  for U.S. grapefruit  in terms  of volume
market. The ultimate result of these export  re-  and revenue, and Japan has developed into the
strictions  is  reallocation  of  supplies  among  major export  market  for  the U.S.  (see Figure
markets.  1).  Fresh  grapefruit  exports  have  increased
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FIGURE  1.  QUARTERLY  SALES  OF  FRESH  U.S.  GRAPEFRUIT  IN  THE  EXPORT
MARKETS,  1971-1975
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83from  226 million pounds  (2.7 million boxes) in  market i in quarter t (millions pounds)
1970  to  more  than  554  million  pounds  (6.5  Pit =  FOB price of fresh grapefruit to market i
million boxes) in 1975.  From 1970 to  1975 the  (dollars per pound)
share  of  U.S.  fresh grapefruit  shipped  to  the  Iit = per capita GNP in market i2
export  markets  increased  from  10  to  23  per-  t  = quarterly  time  periods  (t  =  1,  3rd  qtr.
cent.  Canada,  Japan,  and  the  EEC  received  1971;.....;  t =  18, 4th qtr. 1975)
nearly  98  percent  of  the  total  grapefruit  ex-  ct =  Israeli  grapefruit  price  (dollars  per
ported from the U.S.  [4].  Before 1972,  Canada  pound)
was  the largest importer, accounting for more  s. =  seasonal  dummy  (s,  =  I  if  April-June;
than 70 percent of the U.S. grapefruit exports.  s9  =  1 if July-Sept.;  or s,  =  I if Oct.-Dec.)
In June  1971,  quantity restrictions  for grape-  and
fruit going  to Japan  were  lifted  and Japan's  i =  fresh grapefruit markets (i=l, U.S.; i=2,
share  increased  to  57  percent  by  1975.  The  Canada; i=3, Japan; and i=4, EEC).
Japanese market in particular has  now grown  The direct effects of prices, income, trends, and
such that restrictions on grapefruit imports to  competing  supplies  are  well  understood  and
Japan  could  greatly  influence  the  total  U.S.  need little explanation, i.e.,  a  i < 0,  a 3i > 0,  a 4i
grapefruit industry.  > 0, fI  > 0.  The  U.S.  supplies  nearly  all  the
fresh  grapefruit  to  the  domestic,  Canadian,
and  Japanese  markets,  whereas  Israel  is  the
GRAPEFRUIT  FOB  DEMAND  major supplier to the EEC.  Therefore,  a  54  > 0
buta 5i  =  0 when 1 < i < 4, implying that Israel
To  approximate  the  effect  of  trade  restric-  has no influence on U.S. grapefruit exports ex-
tions,  an  empirical  measure  of  the  domestic  cept in Europe.  Parameter  a 2i is unique to the
and  export  demands  for  fresh  grapefruit  is  analysis in that it measures  the process of ad-
needed.  These  demands  are  measured  at  the  justment  in  demand  as  markets  mature.
U.S. FOB level over the periods from the third  Specifically,  the  Japanese  market  has
quarter  1971  to the fourth  quarter  1975.  Be-  developed  since  1971  and the elasticity of  de-
cause  the demands  are  measured  at common  mand  may  have  changed  as  taste  for  fresh
points in both space and time, it is likely  that  grapefruit  developed.  The  parameters  (ali  +
the errors  (£it)  in the demand models are relat-  a2  t- 1) reflect the dynamic adjustments in elas-
ed. Under such circumstances  a seemingly un-  ticities and also give some clue as to the length
related regression model should be used [2].  of time required for the elasticities to approxi-
Seemingly  unrelated  regressions  (SUR)  are  mate ai.
appropriate  when  E(it-Ejt)  #  0  letting  i  and  j  The  empirical  counterparts  to  equation  (1)
be  four  different  equations.  When  the errors  are given in Table 1 where the first equation for
are  correlated  across equations  and OLS esti-  each  market is the OLS  estimate  followed  by
mators are used,  it is easily shown that the re-  the  seemingly  unrelated  regression  estimate
suits are  unbiased  but no  longer efficient.  In  [3].  The market  development parameter  a  2i  is
contrast,  if the variance-covariance  matrix of  noted by LM ifor market i. As is evident by the
errors across equations is incorporated into the  standard errors,  considerable  improvement  in
estimation by means of two-stage  Aitken esti-  efficiency follows with the use of seemingly un-
mators,  experimental  results  show  the  related  regression  and  the  parameter  values
estimators to be unbiased and efficient in rela-  generally  change very little with the two esti-
tion to OLS estimates [2, p. 525].  mating techniques.  In particular, the variance
A general  specification  of  the  FOB  derived  of the price  effects  shows nearly  a 50  percent
reduction for each market with SUR.
(1)  ,  n i  .^  MARKET  DEVELOPMENT
(1)  log(qit) =  a0i +  (ali +  a2 i t- 1) log (pit) +  MARKET  DEVELOPMENT
The price parameters  in Table  1 clearly show
i log(it) +  at4ilog (t) +  a5i log (c) +  differential  among  elasticities  for  U.S.,
3  Japanese,  and Canadian markets, whereas the
ji=lji  Sjt  '+  it,  U.S.  price  parameter  for the EEC  is  insignif-
icant and is of questionable use for policy pur-
poses.  The  effect  of U.S. prices might  be  pre-
qit =  quantity of fresh  grapefruit  shipped to  dicted  a priori given  the current  low  level  of
'The model  specification  corresponds  to the final form selected  as representative  of the marcets. Complete  details of this specification  are available  upon re-
quest.  It is assumed that E(  E )  =  0, E( cj  it  _k  =  0, and  c  X N(o, c 2) However.  E(  it  Et) >0.
2
The  income effect was measured with GNP data for each market primarily  because  these data  were up  to date and published  by a  single source.  Because all
parameters were to be estimated with SUR, consistency  in the data source was especially  critical.  Disposable  income data  from one  source  would be  desirable but
were not available to the authors.
84TABLE  1.  COMPARISON  OF RESULTS  OBTAINED  FROM USING  ORDINARY LEAST
SQUARES AND ZELLNER'S TWO-STAGE AITKEN'S PROCEDURES
Dependent
Equation  variable  Intercept  LP  LI  S  S  S2  LT no.  (U.S.)
2.1  LQ  -4.2069  -0.5698  5.8856  -0.5199  -2.9473  -0.3113  -0.7529 1  (5.4997)  (0.3199)  (3.3748)  (0.2762)  (0.2868)  (0.2644)  (0.4231)
2.2b  LQ  -4.8343  -0.7431  5.9662  -0.4207  -2.8360  -0.2110  -0.7972 L 1 (3.3235)  (0.1861)  (2.0467)  (0.1673)  (0.1693)  (0.1598)  (0.2553)
EDependent Equation
no  variable  Intercept  LP2 LI  1  2  LM 2 LT (Canada)  2
2 . 3a  L  -7.1907  -1.5717  6.4244  -0.0965  -0.4546  -0.2656  1.1512  -1.7564
2 (5.1207)  (0.5074)  (4.2139)  (0.1275)  (0.2267)  (0.1197)  (0.8707)  (1.2478)
2.4b  LQ  -4.9598  -1.2551  5.2425  -0.0819  -0.5005  -0.2408  1.0199  -1.4969
2 (2.6784)  (0.2487)  (2.2413)  (0.0695)  (0.1139)  (0.0654)  (0.4645)  (0.6651)
Dependent
Equation  variable  Intercept  LP  LI  S  S  S  I  LM 3 no.  (Japan)  3  3  1  2  3  3 (Japan)
2.5a  L-4.6657  -3.2989  7.5919  0.4689  0.0506  -0.7316  3.3209  -3.2168 L 3 (3.4912)  (1.0265)  (4.7418)  (0.2568)  (0.4496)  (0.3019)  (1.2257)  (1.8363)
26b  -5.8032  -3.5775  9.3919  0.4227  0.0191  -0.7676  3.7815  -3.9217 *2.6  Q 3 (1.7309)  (0.4931)  (2.4665)  (0.1386)  (0.2219)  (0.1569)  (0.6282)  (0.9512)
Dependent Equation
variable  Intercept  LP4 LI4 S1  S3  LM4 LC4 LT (EEC)  4 
2. 7a  LQ  16.0390  0.2134  -4.3700  0.0080  0.2819  -0.7842  3.9258  1.6687 Q 4 (12.5264)  (1.5577)  (7.5360)  (0.3303)  (0.2997)  (1.4008)  (2.5711)  (2.3163)
2.8b  L16.2267  -0.3447  -4.3364  -0.0082  0.3007  -0.8739  4.5593  1.7324 28  LQ4 (6.2735)  (0.7788)  (3.7341)  (0.1825)  (0.1659)  (0.7049)  (1.3149)  (1.1494)
AEstimated by OLS procedure.  Figures in parentheses are standard errors of the estimates. The prefix L implies  the log of the variable where LMi = Log (Pi/)/t and LT =  Log (t).
bEstimated by Zeliner's two-stage Aitken's procedure  [2, p. 525].
U.S. exports to the EEC and the strong substi-  As illustrated in Figure  2,  both the Japanese
tution effect from Israel.  and  Canadian  markets  have  become  more
The  market  development  variable  was  ex-  elastic.  In  early  1972,  Japan's  elasticity  was
eluded from the U.S. because  this market gen-  Percent  of  Elasticity
erally is considered  developed  in terms of con-  in  th  Limit  (
sumer  awareness  of  the  product  [3,  p.  31].  .oo-
Hence,  the  U.S.  elasticity  remains  fixed  at  Canada
-. 7431.  Over  time,  Japanese  and  Canadian
elasticities  approach  the  elastic  limits  of  .90-
-3.5775  and -1.2551,  respectively.  These dif-  Japan
ferences  immediately  suggest that discrimina-
tory pricing could be advantageous  to the U.S.  .80-
grapefruit industry.
Though pricing policies are not developed ex-
tensively  in  this  article,  differential  pricing  70- 
cannot  be  exercised  without  consideration  of  D=  - ()  (l)
long-term effects from potential entry of other
suppliers.  Because  the  U.S.  is  the  dominant  .60
supplier  of  fresh  grapefruit  to  Japan  and
Canada and has  developed  a complex  market-
ing infrastructure in these markets, it is likely72  '7  '75  '76 
that the entry forestalling price is high.  st qtr.  st  qtr.1t  tr.st  qtr.  Ist qtr.  1st qtr
One  simple measure  of  development  (Di) in  FIGURE 2.  ADJUSTMENT  IN  THE
each market can be  shown by relating the cur-  ELASTICITY  FOR  EXPORT
rent  period  elasticity  (Ei1 to the  limits noted  ELASTICITY  FOR  EXPORT
above  (i.e., lim Eit =  i and Di =  1+(  +  DA)  (t)).  JAPAN.
85approximately  70  percent  of its  limit and  by  markets,  changes  in  the  total  U.S.  supplies
1976  was nearly  95  percent  of its  limit.  The  lead  to  major  adjustments  in  the  allocation
Canadian pattern is slightly higher but similar.  among the markets.  If one uses 1976 data and
For  subsequent  periods  the analyses  indicate  assumes  the  supplies  in Figure  3,  the  model
that little additional elasticity adjustment can  indicates  that  for  low  supplies  most  of  the
be expected and, hence, the relative differences  fresh  grapefruit  would  be  used  domestically.
among elasticities should be stable. Because of  For  larger  supplies,  exports to Japan  show a
this stability, the relative effects of discrimina-  rapid  increase  whereas  only minimal  changes
tory pricing  policies  could  be  expected  to  be  in Canada and EEC are evident.
more stable in subsequent seasons.
The simulated total revenue  generated  from
the changing market shares is given in Figure
ALLOCATION  OF  GRAPEFRUIT  4  and  the major  importance  of  the  Japanese
SUPPLIES  market  is  clearly  illustrated.  As  supplies  in-
crease,  revenues  from domestic  sales decline.
Given  the  stability  noted  in  Figure  2,  the  In  contrast,  revenues  from  exports  to  Japan
seemingly unrelated regression model (Table 1)  more than offset the reductions in domestic  re-
can be used to simulate the impact of changing  turns. Hence,  total revenues  increase with the
supplies  and  trade  restrictions.  For  a  U.S.  reallocation  of  supplies  via  changing  market
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FIGURE 3.  CHANGES  IN  MARKET  SHARES  IN  THE  FOUR  MARKETS  AS  SUPPLY
LEVELS CHANGED, ASSUMING NO PRICE DISCRIMINATION,  1976
JAPAN  TRADE  RESTRICTIONS  the  model  from  Table  1,  the potential  effects
from various  levels  and timing of restrictions
Trade restrictions on U.S. grapefruit exports  can be shown.
to Japan lead to a reallocation of supplies that  The total revenues generated at any point in
generally  must  be  absorbed  in  the  U.S.  time depend  on  the pricing  policies and other
domestic  market.  The  threat  of  such  restric-  variables  included  in  equation  (1).  However,
tions is real,  especially  because of current  dis-  the  adjustments  resulting  from  Japanese
putes  over the types of fumigants that can be  imports  can  be  generalized  as  illustrated  in
used on fruit exported  to Japan  [3].  By use of  Figure  5.  Assuming  no  price differentials,
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FIGURE 4.  CHANGES  IN  REVENUES  IN THE  FOUR MARKETS  AS  SUPPLY  LEVELS
CHANGED, ASSUMING NO PRICE DISCRIMINATION,  1976
Percent  of  Total
Returns  After  Restrictions  1976  season.  The relative adjustments  should
100  4thuarer100  remain  fairly  constant  beyond  this point  be-
:  \4th  quarter.  \0  cause  the market  development  index  can  be
Ist quiarter  used  to  show  that  the  elasticity  coefficients
75-  \  ..  . 75  were  near  their  asymptotic  limits  by  1976.
n.  d  Given  the elastic nature  of Japanese  demand
3rd  qua  rter,.  ^r^  and the strong seasonal adjustments shown in
50  -\  '50  Figure  1,  the greatest absolute dollar loss from
\  i  trade  restrictions  can  be  expected  in  the
second and third quarters.
25  - - 25  Figures  3, 4, and 5 illustrate the relative ad-
justments if one assumes no price differentials.
In 1976 there was a differential and grapefruit
_  —_  I  I  Percent  Trade  exported to Japan sold at a premium as shown 0  25  50  75  100  Restriction  by
Japan  in Table  2.  Though the relationships in the pre-
FTFIGURE  5. FFECrTOFvious  figures  hold,  the  absolute  dollar  effect FIGURE  5.  EFFECT  OF  JAPANESE  from restrictions  will be different as a result of
TRADE  RSTRCTIOS  O  the premium price to Japan. The last column in TOTAL  U.S.  GRAPEFRUIT TROTAL  .S.  GR  EFRUIT  Table  2  shows the  revenue  loss after  starting RETURNS  u  with the 1976 price differential and no trade re-
strictions.
Figure  5  shows  the  percentage  reduction  in  A price premium for exports to Japan is first
total returns resulting from different  levels of  evident for the base assumption  in Table  2. If
trade  restrictions  by  Japan.  The  relative  ef-  trade restrictions were placed  as illustrated in
.fects  of the restrictions  differ  on  a  quarterly  the first column,  it  is assumed  that the U.S.
basis; the greatest relative effect is during the  grapefruit  industry  would  continue  to  price
third  quarter  and  the  least  effect  is  in  the  along the Japanese demand curve (Table 1) and
fourth quarter. The effects of the trade restric-  the price to Japan would increase. The remain-
tions illustrated  in Figure  5  are based  on  the  ing supply resulting from the reduced exports
87Table  2.  EFFECTS  OF  JAPANESE  TRADE  RESTRICTIONS  USING  ACTUAL  DATA  IN  1976
Japanese  Domestic  and  Other  Exports  Total'Fresh
Embargo
Eb  pra  Change in
Price  Exports  Revenues  Price  Quantity  Revenue  Quantity  Revenue  rnge  nu
($/lbs.)  (mil.  lbs.)  (mil.  $)  ($/lbs.)  (lbs.)  (mil.$)  (lbs.)  (mil.$)  (mil.$)
Base
(no  embargo)  .107  317.7  33.99  .059  2118.4  124.99  2436.1  158.98
25%  .116  238.3  27.64  .056  2197.8  123.08  2436.1  150.72  -8.26
50%  .131  158.9  20.81  .053  2277.2  120.69  2436.1  141.50  -17.48
75%  .161  79.4  12.78  .050  2356.7  117.83  2436.1  130.61  -28.37
100%  - - --  .048  2436.1  116.93  2436.1  116.93  -42.05
TABLE 2.  EFFECTS OF JAPANESE  TRADE RESTRICTIONS  USING ACTUAL  DATA IN
1976
aExports are expressed in millions of pounds where there are 85 pounds in a 1 3/5 bu. box.
bPrices are estimated from the SUR model whereas the base shipments represent actual quantities  for  1976. These
base prices differ slightly from the actual prices in 1976  (i.e.,  actual P. =  .098 and P, =  .060). The simulated  prices  were
used for consistency in the price adjustments as exports to Japan are reduced.
to  Japan  is  assumed  to  be  absorbed  in  the  A  proposed  U.S.  ban on  the  fumigant  cur-
other  fresh  markets.  Hence,  the  price  to the  rently being used on fruit exported to Japan re-
other  markets must fall.  Under these circum-  presents a real threat to future exports.  Like-
stances  one  can  easily  trace  through  the  ad-  wise, certain alternative pest control measures
justments  in both volume  and returns.3 Note  do not meet Japanese  standards.  Restrictions
from  Table  2  that  a  complete  embargo  by  on  product  labeling  and  problems  with  ship-
Japan  would  reduce  U.S.  revenues  by  $42  ping delays  make  the  economic  environment
million or 26.4 percent.  for exports particulary uncertain.
The Japanese market for fresh grapefruit  is
shown  to  have  had  an  increasing  level  of
CONCLUSION  importance  to the long run economic viability
of  the  U.S.  grapefruit  industry.  Efforts  to
Both  economic  and  political  problems  solve  the  problems  discussed  are  absolutely
leading  to  restrictions  against  Japanese  essential  to  the  continual  growth  of  this
imports  of U.S.  fresh grapefruit  are of major  market. The economic  impact  of trade restric-
concern to the grapefruit  industry. The poten-  tions  can  be  expected  to  become  even  more
tial impact of export embargoes is shown. Such  severe as Japan's share of U.S. exports increas-
restrictions and potential for restrictions  arise  es.  Japan  can  expect  to  acquire  increasing
both  from  Japanese  bans  against  certain  buyer power as it becomes the major consumer
chemicals and packaging  use and from import  of U.S. exported grapefruit.
quotas.
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